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Abstract. Since the 80’s with the experience of Chile, the 
electric sector has suffered, in many counties, a process of 
deregulation and liberalization. In almost of the countries, that 
process originated the appearance of a Pool where the 
participants of the market trade the electrical energy on a basis 
of half-hour or one hour of the next day. However, like the 
traditional markets, the agents of electricity markets are now 
exposed to the volatility of market price, so far inexistent in 
those markets. In some countries, to face that problem and to 
turn the market more liquid have been introduced derivatives 
markets – futures and options, to negotiate products with 
underlying active the electrical energy. In this context, there is a 
need of decision-support tools that allow those agents to use 
derivatives markets with the objective of practicing the hedge 
and simultaneously increase their results. In this paper, we 
present a decision model that supports producers in the 
establishment of contracts with the objective to maximize the 
profit expected utility. The paper presents a group of examples 
of the use of this decision-support system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The separation between product – energy – and service – 
transport and distribution – is the fundamental 
characteristic of the recent deregulation of the electric 
sector. This deregulation, associated to the liberalization 
on an unbundled system, allows the free competition in 
sectors of activity traditionally monopolist. Facing the 
new reality, the participants of electricity markets must 
deal with new challenges and new risks. 
 
The volatility of electric energy price in spot markets is, 
among the risks in a liberalized market, the one that 
poses major concerns to the agents of the electric market 
and, in particular, to the producers.  
 
To reduce their expose to variations in electricity price in 
spot markets, producers and others agents who participate 
in those markets make extensive use of futures and 
options contracts with the objective to practice the hedge. 
 
Some works were realized with the objective to develop 
tools that permit a better management of the risk in 
electricity markets. For example, [1] presents a model for 
the risk management in the valuation of contracts in 
electricity markets using the concept of efficient frontier 
for the representation of the relation profit vs risk, [2] 
presents a group of strategies for the use of futures 
contracts in electricity markets with the objective to 
minimize the risk associated to the volatility of electricity 
price in the spot market. [3] presents a decision support 
model based in the Benders decomposition techniques. 
 
Brokers are too exposed to risks from price variation 
once that they sell energy, to the client’s majority, at 
fixed tariffs, while the energy is bought at Pool prices. 
However, the risks faces by brokers are substantially 
superiors to those that producers faces because producers 
may decide not to produce if they consider Pool price to 
low, while brokers only could interrupt the energy supply 
to the consumers when Pool price is to high and if they 
have interruptible contracts. 
 
 
2.  Causes for the volatility of energy price 
 
The fluctuation of Pool energy price is directly dependent 
of two factors: 
 
• Charge characteristics; 
• Producer’s characteristics. 
 
The charge characteristics that have more impact in the 
marginal price of the system are: 
 
• Seasonality - the charge is not constant, changing 
daily, weekly and even annually; 
• Mean Reversion – the demand suffer temporary 
sudden variations, often associated to extreme 
changes in weather conditions, sports or social events 
finishing at the demand level of the lasts days; 
• Stochastic growth – the demand growth of electric 
energy is correlated with the country economy 
growth, being for that, very difficult to predict her 
evolution for long periods. 
 
The producer’s characteristics that have a major impact 
in system marginal price are: 
 
• Technology – the technology used in the production 
of electric energy is the principal responsible factor 
for the production costs, having for that a 
fundamental influence in producer’s bids; 
• Generators availability – the generators service 
departure due to damage or due to maintenance 
programs, could have a high influence in electric 
energy price; 
• Fuel price – all over the world the major part of 
electric energy are of thermal origin, like oil, natural 
gas and coal. Variations in fuel prices have a high 
impact in energy cost and consequently in producers 
bids; 
• Technical restrictions – the technical characteristics 
of generators as operating costs, minimum running 
time, minimum shutting time, ramp-rate and 
mechanical constraints have a high impact in 
producers bids and consequently on the shape of the 
supply bid curve; 
• Import/Export – producer’s participations in various 
electricity markets could influence their bids and 
consequently the shape of the supply bid curve. 
 
 
3. Derivatives markets in electric sector 
 
The derivatives markets in electric sector were 
introduced with the objective to turn the electric market 
more liquid and to provide a group of tools that permit to 
the electric energy agents the practice of hedge. 
 
They are very similar to those that exist in traditional 
markets with the characteristic that negotiate products 
with underlying active the electric energy. The 
derivatives markets could be organized or not. The 
organized markets sell normalized contracts while the not 
organized markets, designated for OTC (over-the 
counter) markets, sell contracts not normalized. 
 
A. Forward Contracts 
 
One forward contract is a bilateral agreement where the 
two parts agree mutually the characteristics (price, 
quantity, place and date) of one transaction where the 
payment and the delivery of the asset only are realized in 
a future date, being the price pre-established, been so, 
eliminated the risk associated to the price variation. 
 
This type of contracts are different from futures contracts 
because exist the clear intention for the physical delivery 
of the asset and they are normally negotiated in not 
organized markets (off-exchange). 
 
The realization of a forward contract involve two parts 
where the seller assume a short position and the buyer a 
long position and the price established in the contract are 
designated by delivery price. 
 
Assume that, the spot price per unit of energy in the 
instant that the contract reaches the maturity is ST and the 
delivery price, per unit of energy, established in the 
contract is K. The payoff of a long position is equal to 
 
ST-K 
 
This payoff is represented in Fig. 1 and it is a result of the 
obligation by the seller to sell and the buyer to buy the 
electrical energy negotiated for the value K. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Payoff at maturity for a long positio
contract 
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Fig. 2.  Payoff at maturity for a short po
forward contract 
 
 
Where, 
 
K = Delivery Price 
ST = Spot price when the contract rich the m
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B. Futures Contracts 
 
Futures contracts are very similar to forw
The characteristics that distinguish them 
contracts are: 
 
1. Are normalized contracts and negotiate
markets, being guaranteed the comp
contracts by the Clearing House; 
2. The exercise of that type of contra
financial, in other words, could not coSTK 
 Payoffn in a forward 
d in Fig. 2 and 
s
n
e
d
lSTKsition in a 
aturity 
hort position 
es, as a result 
 by the seller 
livery price) 
ard contracts. 
from forward 
 in organized 
iment of the 
cts could be 
ntemplate the 
physical delivery of the energy negotiated in the 
contract; 
3. The Clearing House as a demonstration of good faith 
requires an initial amount of money - Initial Margin - 
and a maintenance amount – Maintenance Margin – 
along the life of the future contract. 
 
 
 
C. Options Contracts 
 
 
Options contracts are contracts that could be established 
in organized markets or not, giving to his owner, in 
exchange for a certain monetary quantity (the premium), 
the right but not the obligation of buy (call option) or sell 
(put option) a certain quantity of electrical energy, in a 
predetermined data for a pre-established price. 
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Exist two types of options, and the factor that 
distinguishes them is the moment that the options are 
exercised: 
 
• “American options”, could be exercised at any time 
until the expiration date. These types of options are, 
however, very expensive due to their versatility; 
• “European options”, only could be exercised at their 
expiration date. 
 
In Table I are discriminated the rights and the obligations 
of the buyer and the seller of call options and put options 
are discriminated. 
 
 
TABLE I. – Rights and obligations of buyers and sellers of 
options 
 
The options could have two forms of exercise: 
 
• Monetary delivery: the buyer of the option demand to 
the seller the delivery of an monetary amount equal to 
the profit that he have if he buy (call) or sell (put) the 
energy at the exercise price and then (call) or after 
(put) sell it (call) or buy it (put) in the spot market. 
• Physical delivery: the buyer of the option demand to 
the seller the delivery of an amount of energy 
established in the contract at the conditions accorded. 
 
Accordingly to the exercise price and the price of the 
energy in the spot market, options are grouped in three 
categories: 
 
• In-the-money – if the exercise price is inferior to the 
price in the spot market for call options and if the 
exercise price is superior to the price in the spot 
market for put options; 
• At-the-money – if the exercise price is equal to the 
price in the spot market; 
• Out-the-money – if the exercise price is superior to 
the price in the spot market for call options and if the 
exercise price is inferior to the price in the spot 
market for put options. 
 
 
 
4. Decision Process 
 
 
One of the biggest problems that a producer faces when 
he pretend to practice the hedge is the difficulty that he 
faces to predict the system marginal price for a certain 
period i in question. 
 
So, is fundamental the consideration of a group of 
scenarios for the system marginal price to the period in 
question and associate to them a certain probability based 
on statistics studies or based on the opinion of an expert. 
 
The decision process here presented comprise, for a 
certain programmed period, the determination of optimal 
quantities of energy to negotiate in “financial markets” 
and the foresee energy to negotiate in the spot market, in 
function of previous contracts established, with the 
objective to maximize the profit expected utility. 
 
The decision process scheme is represented by Fig. 3. 
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Subjected to: 
 
 
Where, 
 
• pmis represent, for the period i, the marginal electrical 
energy price for the scenario s. 
 
• pis represent, for the period i, the probability of 
occurrence of scenario s. 
 
•  futuresv  Represent the sells of the existent futures 
contracts for the supply of a quantity Q , for the 
period i and scenario s, at the exercise price K
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•   v Represent the sells that the producer will 
do if he sell the call option with the quantity 
at the exercise price and 
premium , for the period i and scenario s. 
The amount of money that the producer will do with 
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We admit that the buyer of the option call only 
exercise the option if the price in the spot market will 
be higher then the exercise price, and the producer are 
able to sell the energy negotiated in the spot market if 
the buyer don’t exercise the option. 
 
•  v  Represent the sells that the producer will 
do with the sell of the existent call option with the 
quantity at the exercise price 
and premium for the period i 
and scenario s. The amount of money that the 
producer will do with the sells of the existents call 
options is determinate in the same way that the call 
options that the producer wants to negotiate. 
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In the put options we also admit that the buyer of the 
put option only exercise the option if the price in the 
spot market will be inferior to the exercise price, and 
the producer are able to sell the energy negotiated in 
the spot market if the buyer don’t exercise the option. 
 
•   v Represent the sells that the producer will 
do with the buy of the existent put option with the 
quantity   at the exercise price  
and premium for the period i and scenario 
s. The amount of money that the producer will do 
with the sells of the existents put options is 
determinate in the same way then the put options that 
the producer wants to negotiate. 
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•  v Represent the sells as a result by the sell of the 
quantity in the spot market, for the period i and 
scenario s, and they are given by . 
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• Qmáx represents the maximum active power that the 
generator can produce. 
 
• Qmin represents the minimum active power that the 
generator can produce.  
 
• C(.) represent the production costs for a active power 
expressed in MW. 
 
The difficulty to obtain the result of the sells and buys of 
the call and put options, as well the combinatory 
character of this problem to obtain the optimal quantity to 
establish in each contract and to sell in spot market 
depending on the scenario, turn impossible the resolution 
of this problem for the traditional methods. 
 
So, to resolve this problem and to overtake to old 
problems we use genetic algorithms, particularly the 
EVOLVER software. 
 
 
6. Study Case 
 
Let us considering an example with the aim to determine 
the optimal quantity of energy that a producer must 
negotiate in futures and options contracts and the energy 
that he should sell in the spot market, for a certain period 
i1. In this example, we consider the scenarios for 
marginal system price for that period presented in Table 
II. 
 
TABLE II - System marginal price scenarios for the period i 
 
Price 22 27 
Probability 0.4 0.6 
 
 
The contracts previously established are presented in 
Table III and IV. 
 
TABLE II – Options contracts previously established 
 
Options Short call Long Put 
Exercise price 
(€/MWh) 
22.00 25.00 
Premium (€/MWh) 1.12 1.40 
Quantity/Contract 
(MWh) 
10 10 
N.º of contracts 1 1 
 
TABLE III – Futures contracts previously established 
 
Futures  
N.º of contracts 0 
 
We admit that futures and options contracts will be 
established in organized markets with the characteristics 
are presented in Tables V and VI. 
 
TABLE V – Futures contracts characteristics for period i 
 
Quantity (MWh) Delivery Price (€/MWh) 
15 24.80 
 
 
                                                          
1 We consider that the period i has one hour of duration.  
TABLE IVI – Options contracts characteristics for period i 
 
 Exercise 
price 
(€/MWh) 
Premium 
(€/MWh) 
Quantity/Contract 
(MWh) 
Call 24.00 1.68 10 
Put 24.00 1.12 10 
 
 
A.  Results 
 
The results for the example considered are presented in 
Tables VII, VIII and IX. 
 
TABLE VI – Optimal options contracts to realize 
 
Options Short call Long Put 
Exercise price 
(€/MWh) 
24.00 24.00 
Premium (€/MWh) 1.68 1.12 
Quantity/Contract 
(MWh) 
10 10 
N.º of contracts 4 0 
 
TABLEVII – Optimal futures contracts to realize 
 
Futures  
N.º of contracts 0 
 
TABLE IX – Spot energy forecast to sell in spot market for 
period i 
 
Spot  
Quantity (MWh) 40 
 
 
Considering that all contracts have to be established in 
organized markets, from the results we observe that the 
electrical energy producer for the period i mustn’t sell 
any forward contract, sell four call options and expect to 
sell 40 MWh in the spot market. 
 
The producer does not know if the buyer will exercise or 
not the options that he purchase and has to decide if 
exercise or not the put option previously negotiated for 
the same period i. 
 
To decide that, we calculate for all situations of exercise 
for the options the expected profit for period i and the 
standard deviation of the profit considering system 
marginal in the interval [20; 30] €/MWh. 
 
Note that, like we consider in the decision model, in all 
situations that the options weren’t exercised, the 
electrical energy negotiated in those contracts will be 
negotiated in the spot market at the considered marginal 
price. 
 
The results are presented in Fig. 4 considering the 
nomenclature presented in Table X. 
 
TABLE X – Designation for the nomenclature used 
 
Nomenclature Designation 
All All options are exercised 
Call+Call_E Only the new call option and the 
previously negotiated call option are 
exercised 
Call Only the new call option is exercised 
Call+Put_E Only the new call option and the 
previously negotiated put option are 
exercised 
Call_E Only the previously negotiated call 
option is exercised 
Call_E+Put_E Only the previously call option and put 
options are exercised 
Put_E Only the previously negotiated put 
option is exercised 
None None of the options are exercised 
 
Fig. 4 – Expected profit and profit standard deviation 
 
Through the analysis of the results presented in Fig.2 it is 
visible that the producer should, in any situation, exercise 
the put option previously established, because with this 
exercise he can reduce the volatility of the profit. 
 
In situations 1, 2 and 3 the exercise of the put option does 
not increase the expected profit but it reduces de 
volatility. In situation 4, the exercise of the put option 
besides turning the profit bigger, reduces the volatility of 
the profit. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Beside the works realized to model the spot energy price, 
those models are limited and have some difficulties to 
translate so complex characteristics like the 
characteristics of the spot market. 
 
The decision support developed in this work, makes 
extensive use of forward and options contracts to permit 
to the producers the practice of the hedge against the 
volatility of the electricity price in the spot market.  
 
Options in this work reveals extremely useful to reduce 
the volatility of the producer’s return and demonstrate 
that derivatives markets introduce extremely powerful 
tools for the practice of the hedge and to increase their 
results. 
 
However, the decision support model developed in this 
work only looks for the economics aspects. Will be 
useful interact this decision support model with technical 
validation. The use of a knowledge base that support the 
decision based in earlier events will be also extremely 
useful. 
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